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In the research report issued by sell-side analysts, earnings forecasts and 
recommendation, as the most direct and refined summary of the listed company, received 
most attention from investors. Among these two items, recommendation reflects analysts’ 
global opinion on the fundamental value of the company more intuitively and 
synthetically. Existing literature has proved that, compared to recommendation itself, 
recommendation revision is more informative, and can provide more powerful investment 
references to investors. Moreover, as the employees of broker, sell-side analysts work in 
an ecosphere, in which they have close ties to listed companies and institutional investors. 
When analysts make recommendation revision by means of their professional knowledge, 
information collecting and decision analysis ability, as “Profit Maximization” rational 
entities, they are probably willing to maintain their relationship with interested parties, 
and also constrained by their external reputation. What are the impacts of these social 
factors on sell-side analysts’ recommendation revision and its success rate? 
This paper empirically studies conflicts of interest, reputation and sell-side analysts’ 
recommendation revision using analysts’ recommendation revision data from Jan. 1, 2001 
to Jun. 30, 2010. The conflicts of interest include those between sell-side analysts and the 
underwriter of listed company, sell-side analysts and the institutional investor such as 
mutual fund. In detail, we check whether conflicts of interest result in analysts’ 
optimistically recommendation revision, and whether reputation mechanism can restrict 
this tendency. Further we define “Recommendation Revision Success” variable (Success), 
which means if sell-side analysts make a recommendation up-revision (down-revision) on 
the listed company, and the 12-month CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return) is larger 
(smaller) then 10 (-10) percent, we claim that this recommendation revision is successful. 
Then, using the event study method, we check whether conflicts of interest, reputation 
mechanism have impact on the success rate of recommendation revision. 
















company, long term CAR presents “drift effect”, that reaction to positive stock 
recommendation revision is incomplete in the recommendation revision month, with the 
market continuing to underreact for 12 months subsequently. Also after the 
recommendation revision, the proportion of companies whose 1 to 12-month CAR is with 
the same direction of the recommendation revision exceeds 50 percent. To some extent, 
this reflects analysts’ recommendation ability. Conflict of interest between analysts and 
underwriter has negative impact on the success rate of recommendation up-revision 
significantly. Mutual funds’ shareholding ratio on listed companies has no significant 
impact on the tendency of sell-side analysts’ recommendation revision. However, due to 
“information clarity” effect is larger than relationship maintaining effect, the higher 
mutual funds’ shareholding ratio is, the higher success rate of recommendation 
up-revision is. The evaluation system from independent third party is supposed to restrict 
sell-side analysts’ relationship maintaining behavior. However, in the context of the 
current system in China, we find no evidence of reputation mechanism like this. 
Reputation is not a reference of the success rate of recommendation revision. 
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第一节  选题背景与研究意义 
2010 年 9 月 6 日，湘财证券在分析师研究报告中提出，中国宝安黑龙江宝安新
能源投资有限公司可为贝特瑞（中国宝安控股的一家深圳新能源材料公司）提供近
2.68 亿吨储量、适合于锂离子二次电池使用的优质石墨矿产资源，评级为买入。随
后，平安证券、国泰君安、信达证券也先后在 2010 年 11 月 5 日、2011 年 1 月 21
日和 2011 年 2 月 21 日发布了类似研究报告，将评级调整为买入。中国宝安的股价
开始一路飙升，并于 2011 年 2 月份到达每股 25.45 元的高点。然而，近乎两个季度























































































第二节  研究思路和论文结构 
一、研究思路 
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